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in those days they wanted to kill all the indigenous people. He was
in charge of the country then - that Lucas Garcia, is he in jail yet?
What's happening with that?
2
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1. Genocide is defined as: "... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
It should also be noted that under the Convention the attempt to commit genocide or complicity in genocide
are also contemplated as punishable acts. Convention on the Prevention and Punislment of Genocide.
2. "En ese tiempo queran matar a los indfgenas. El manda al pals. -Este Lucas Garcia estar ya
preso? "C6mo va esa cosa?" Collective Testimony-Rabinal, in Guatemala: Memory ofSilence, Vol. II!, Ch.
II, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 1 3362. Author's translation. All cites to the final report of the Historical
Clarification Commission, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, refer to the complete Spanish-language version,
unless otherwise specified. The cites contain Volume, Chapter, Section and paragraph numbers instead of
page numbers because the paragraph numbers correspond to both the print and electronic versions of the
complete report, which can be found online at <http://www.hrdata.aaas.org/ceh>. General Lucas Garcia
served as president from 1978 to March 1982, when he was unseated in a coup d'etat and replaced by General
Rios Montt, now Secretary-General of the FRG party and recently elected to a seat in the Guatemalan
National Assembly. Rios Montt was also unseated in a military-sponsored coup in August, 1983.
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Well you know, they wanted to finish off all the villages, but we
were lucky, thank the Lord, because we were able to get away, 'cause
for them to finish the job meant not just frightening people, not just
killing one, or two, or three - it meantfinishing off everyone once and
for all, because like I heard as I was leaving - escaping from under
streams of bullets - I heard a soldier say, "come on men, lets go kill,
kill them all - because now it's time to kill.3
On December 29, 1996 the Guatemalan government and the Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG),4 signed peace accords
bringing an end to thirty-four years of internal armed conflict. As part of the
transition to peace it was agreed that a commission be created to document and
clarify the history of the violence and the causes of the conflict. This
commission would also be called upon to formulate recommendations about
how to "encourage peace and national harmony."'
On the other hand, the Guatemalan truth and national conciliation package
would permit criminal trial and punishment for persons found responsible for
torture, forced disappearance and genocide. This position represented a com-
promise on the hotly debated issue of amnesty. By allowing these crimes,
representing gross violations of human rights, to be exempted from the list of
offenses whose prosecution could be suspended under the 1996 National
Reconciliation Law,6 impunity for those violations would arguably be limited.
On the other hand, the truth-telling function normally associated with criminal
trials would be delegated to the Historical Clarification Commission,7 where
3. "Ellos pues quisieron terminar a las aldeas pero que suerte tenemos a nuestro Sefior porque
logramos escapar, porque ellos que para terminar no es para asustar a la gente, no es para matar a uno, dos
o tres, sino que para terminar de una vez, porque segdn he ofdo cuando salf pues de escapar bajo chorros de
tiros, entonces of que dijo un soldado que maten muclA, maten a todos porque ahora ya es tiempo de matar."
Collective Testimony from Pexla Grande, Nebaj, Quichd, in Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch.
Il, Sec. XXI, Genocide, i 3226. Author's English translation.
4. Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, a coalition of the four opposition guerrilla
organizations, the EGP (Ejdrcito Guerrillero de los Pobres), ORPA (Organizacidn del Pueblo en Armas) FAR
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, formerly Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes), and the PGT (Partido Guatemalteco
de Trabajadores) that came together to form the URNG in 1982. Before that they operated independently
with the PGT operating primarily in the political arena, albeit clandestinely. The other three organizations,
formed at different historical moments had both a political branch and military units throughout the conflict.
5. Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations
and Acts of Violence that Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, Oslo, 23 June 1994, reproduced
in The Guatemala Peace Agreements, United Nations Department of Public Information, (1998.)
6. Decree Law # 145- 96 was proposed on presidential initiative. Negotiated in the context of the
peace talks, the law was a product of an agreement between the parties to the conflict with the aid of the
United Nations moderator.
7. Guatemala Peace Agreements, supra note 5. [hereinafter Oslo Accord].
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judgments about responsibility for human rights violations would take into
account a broad historical context. The duty to discover and speak the truth in
its final report was limited only by the prohibition against "individualizing
responsibility" for the "human rights violations and incidents of violence"8 it
documented.9 The Oslo Accord memorialized the agreement between the
Guatemalan Government and URNG on the creation of the Historical
Clarification Commission, and constituted an essential component of the overall
peace process.'0
While the Commission's role in the peace process did not contemplate
criminal prosecutions, its mandate gave it the power to renderjudgments based
on international human rights law applicable to the Guatemalan conflict. A
legal framework had to be constructed that would underlie the Commission's
judgments and shape its conclusions. A good deal of time was spent focusing
on the scope and methods of information-gathering and on the determination of
which sources of law should be applied and how. The Accord's call for the
clarification of "human rights violations" and "incidents of violence" related to
the conflict, provided the principal guidance on the scope of the inquiry. In
addition, references contained in other agreements, " comprising the final peace
8. ld. 11.
9. Some argue that the Commission was further handicapped by his inability to subpoena witn-
esses and compel the production of documents. It is interesting to note in this regard, that the final report
reproduces the correspondence reflecting the dialogue between the Commissioners and the Government on
the issue of government collaboration in the production of information. Also noted are efforts to gather
information from other governments. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Annex III and Vol. 1, Metho-
dological Considerations.
10. The Oslo Accord also stated that the Commission's work would have "no judicial effect." This
declaration is largely moot, as the Commission points out, because it did not have the power to suspend the
exercise of citizen rights to complain of past abuses or prosecutorial obligations to pursue those complaints
in the nationaljudicial system. Practically speaking, the Report and its conclusions are of limited evidentiary
value without the presence of the underlying witnesses and documentation. The Commission's additional
obligation to maintain confidentiality, ("The Commission's proceedings shall be confidential so as to
guarantee the secrecy of the sources and the safety of witnesses and informants." Oslo Accord), means that
a prosecutor would have to discover the identity of witnesses through independent means. However, it is
entirely possible that the Commission's factual analyses, legal arguments and the references to historical and
social context will inspire a framework for victims and conscientious prosecutors to seek redress for the gross
violations of human rights documented, without in any way violating this limitation on the Clarification
Commission mandate. See the Report's discussion of the Commission's mandate, Vol. I, Mandate and
Procedures, 168. In fact, some prosecutions relating to public officials' criminal responsibility for forced
disappearances have already been filed. For instance, the accusation of Adriana Portillo against Donaldo
Alvarez Rufz, Germin Chupina Barahona, Pedro Garcia Arredondo, and Manuel de Jesds Valiente Tillez all
of whom held positions of authority over security forces, for the disappearance of five family members in
1981. See Acusacidn en MP, Prensa Ubre, 4 agosto de 1999.
11. The Comprehensive Human Rights Agreement called on the United Nations to verify the
observance of human rights with "particular attention to the rights to life, integrity and security of persons,
to individual liberty, to due process, to freedom of expression, to freedom of movement, to freedom of
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accord, gave preference to monitoring breaches of fundamental human rights,
such as the rights to life, liberty, security, expression, association, movement,
and due process. This hierarchy of values was further defined by the United
Nations' ongoing verification of the behavior of both State and opposition
actors. While there would be no criminal sanctions imposed by this body, the
force of the Commission's recommendations' 2 depended on the strength of its
investigations and the solidity of its historical and legal analysis.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal framework incorporated those international treaties ratified by
Guatemala, among them the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 3 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II. " International customary law,'5 particularlyjus cogens
norms, were also used to frame the legal inquiry, including the concept of
"crimes against humanity,"'.6 which has eluded a uniform codification. 7 While
association, and to political rights." Comprehensive Human Rights Agreement, Part X, International
Verification by the United Nations, § 12, in The Guatemala Peace Agreements, United Nations Department
of Public Information (1998), p. 30.
12. The Commission had as one of its purposes, to "formulate specific recommendations to
encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala. The Commission shall recommend, in particular,
measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of
human rights and to strengthen the democratic process." Oslo Accord, supra note 5, at _ .
13. Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1949 and deposited its ratification in 1950. In
the Guatemalan Criminal Code, genocide is punishable by a sentence of twenty to thirty years in prison. See
Article 376 Criminal Code, Decree 17-73 as amended (1997).
14. Guatemala ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1987, and the Geneva
Conventions themselves in 1952. The Commission determined that Additional Protocols II "reflected the uses
and practices universally accepted as customary international law and/or as juridical principles universally
accepted based on common Article 3. This is reason why these norms should be considered as a valid and
relevant point of reference." Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I1, Ch. II, Sec. Vill Legal Framework,
1685. Author's translation.
15. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II, Ch. 1I, Sec. VIII, Legal Framework, 1647-48.
16. While the Commission does not settle on a particular definition for crimes against humanity,
the following analysis best reflects its understanding of the unique elements of those crimes: "The Tribunal
in the Justice Case affirmed that crimes against humanity encompassed inhumane acts and persecutions that
were "systematically organized and conducted by or with the approval of government." The implications of
this aspect of its decision were not lost on the Tribunal, which observed "Only when official organs of
sovereignty participated in atrocities and persecutions did those crimes assume international proportions," -
that is, become international crimes. At the same time, those charged with crimes against humanity could
not escape liability by claiming the traditional immunities extended by international law to acts of state and
to individuals whose official positions ordinarily entitled them to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of
other states." Diane Orentlicher, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Early Warning and Prevention,
December 8-10 ,1998, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Genocide and CrimesAgainstHumanity:
The Legal Regime, Citations omitted. On file with author.
17. Crimes against humanity have been codified with varying terms and definitions in the post
world-war two international tribunals, including most recently the ones approved by the Security Council for
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the Commission makes note of the human rights protections contained in the
Guatemalan Constitutions in force during the conflict, it also points out that
these provisions were systematically violated by successive governments.
Finally, contemporary interpretations of international human rights law were
applied based on the understanding that the nucleus of fundamental rights
framing the analysis of the violence were all derived from the essential
principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
therefore part of binding customary international law or internationally
recognized principles of law,"8 from the time the conflict began in 1962.
II. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSIBILITY
This entire framework was applied to both the State and the guerrilla. 9
However, the acts committed by the guerrilla were referred to as "incidents of
violence" or violations of international humanitarian law, and not human rights
violations, per se. TheCommission was reluctant to find that the guerrilla had
committed human rights violations in the strict sense of the word, inasmuch as
the guerrilla did not have the same affirmative obligation to promote and
guarantee human rights as do the States. Therefore, the concept of "incident of
violence" referred to in the Oslo Accord became the relevant term. 2' However,
it was determined that both the military and the guerrilla were obligated to
comply with humanitarian law norms during the entire period of the conflict.2'
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The most recent codification is contained in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 1998. However, even the Rome Statute acknowledges that alternative definitions may be
valid. See Article 10, Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing
or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
18. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. Il1, Ch. II, Sec. VIII Legal Framework, 1668.
19. The guerrilla actions werejudged under the framework of International Humanitarian Law that,
according to the Commission, included the fundamental principles underlying international human rights law
generally. Thus, the guerrilla was not said to have committed human rights violations per se, because the
guerrilla was not obligated in the same way as the State to provide certain affirmative guarantees. Rather the
guerrilla was said to have violated international humanitarian law and through those actions offended
fundamental principles of human rights. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 11, Ch. 11, Sec. Vill, Legal
Framework, 1658. In order to achieve parity in the analysis and assure the most equal treatment of both
parties, both sources of law were applied then, in principle, to both parties and regarded, in any event, as
being mutually reinforcing and consistent in their goal of protection of fundamental rights such as life,
security of the person, liberty, and due process. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II, Ch. II, Sec. Vill,
Legal Framework, 1676.
20. Id. 1662.
21. There is one reservation expressed regarding the application of humanitarian law, in
consideration that the threshold for establishing an internal conflict was not necessarily reached during every
moment of its thirty-four year duration. The obstacles to consistent levels of documentation for a conflict that
endured over such a long period of time is a significant one in an exercise designed to render specific
judgments. However, it is interesting to note that laws embodying the essence of humanitarian law
protections and perhaps implementing legislation for Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II, can
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Thus, the guerrilla was evaluated on the basis of its compliance with humanitar-
ian law obligations under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to, for
example, treat prisoners in a humane manner, refrain from summary executions,
avoid injury to civilians, refrain from inflicting torture, from destroying private
property,engaging in pillage, etc. Regarding forced disappearances commonly
attributed to the State because of the peculiar requirement that the State have
denied custody of the victim for the purpose of obscuring their fate,22 guerrilla
actions that resulted in the disappearance of persons were said to constitute an
infringement of the right to life, liberty and physical security and a violation
of humanitarian law, but not a human rights violation. In contrast, Guatemalan
State responsibility' was framed in terms of the direct commission of human
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law.
Due to the nature of its mandate, the Commission's analysis of responsibil-
ity under this broad human rights framework focused on institutional, rather
than individual responsibility for human rights violations.24 In addition to the
acts of its own agents, violations were attributed to the State where individuals
acted with the collaboration, consent, support, tolerance or acquiescence of.
State institutions, agents or public officials,25 or where individual violent acts
related to the armed conflict went uninvestigated and unpunished, even when
there was no indication the State had prior knowledge of those particular acts.26
In this way, the persistent impunity for human rights violations characteristic
of the conflict was attributed to the State's systematic failure to act on behalf
of victims or to investigate or punish violators. Additionally, patterns of
be found in the Guatemalan Penal Code. See, e.g., Penal Code Decree # 17-73 as reformed, 1997, Art. 378.
Crimes against humanitarian obligations: Whomsoever violates or infringes humanitarian obligations, laws
or agreements regarding prisoners or hostages of war, those wounded in battle or whomsoever commits any
inhuman act against the civilian population or against hospitals or places designated for the wounded will
be sentenced from twenty to thirty years in prison. Author's translation. The sentence for this crime is the
same sentence provided for in the case of genocide. Id. at Article 376 (Genocide).
22. Guatemala has the dubious honor of being the site of the first documented mass disappearance
in the Americas. The case of the "28 disappeared" document in the Commission's Report occurred in 1966.
Recently released CIA documents affirm that the then Guatemalan government had the victims in custody
and killed them, vowing to deny they had ever been held by the State. To date, there has been no official
acknowledgement of this incident. See Illustrative Case No. 68 in Annex I, Vol. 1 of the Commission's
Report.
23. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. IL Ch. II, Sec. VIII, Legal Framework, W 1656, 1658,
1659.
24. 1 will only refer to the analysis of State violence, given that only the State was found to have
committed genocide and the State was found responsible for ninety-three percent of the violations registered
by the Commission directly. The guerrilla was found responsible for three percent of the violent incidents
registered.
25. The army, civil defense patrollers, military commissioners and police comprised the great
majority of responsible institutions whose acts were attributed to the State.
26. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I Ch. Vil Legal Framework, 1656.
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deliberate obstruction of justice by State agents are amply documented in the
report.27 Impunity is a phenomenon that the United Nations Human Rights
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), 8 pointed to in 1995 as the
single largest obstacle to progress in the respect for human rights in Guatemala,
and that fact continues to represent a major point of contention in evaluating
advances in the peace process. 2
9
The process of investigation included not only the gathering and analysis
of relevant testimony and documentation, but also involved an examination of
the country's broader political and social history. The result was an under-
standing of the dynamics and modus operandi of the violence. Through the
documentation of reiterated and similar practices over time and geographic
locations, much was learned about the levels of planning and coordination
involved in the perpetration of the human rights violations. Moreover, because
the Commission's goal was historical clarification, that is to say, truth-seeking
from the historical and human rights legal perspectives, the focus on institu-
tional rather than individual actions became the most appropriate vehicle for
substantiating concrete recommendations. By demonstrating how State
institutions had become distorted in the service of undemocratic, destructive
and violent ends in the past, the Commission's recommendations became
directly relevant to the peace process. Thus, the focus became the implementa-
tion of measures designed to guarantee that the past would not repeat itself and
that the promotion of fundamental human rights would be a priority for the
future. The implementation of measures designed to guarantee that the past
would not repeat itself as well as promoting the effective future enjoyment of
fundamental human rights was demonstrated."
The Commission's overall conclusion on State responsibility observed
that:
27. Id., See especially the discussion on "Forced Disappearances" in Vol. I1Ch. II, § X1, specifically
regarding the element of official denial of custody and on impunity in Vol. I1. Ch. XVI on "Denial of
Justice," 1 2634.
28. Verification reports at MINUGUA's website at <http://www.minugua.guate.net> (visited Feb.
18, 2000.)
29. The still unsolved murder of Monseflor Juan Gerardi, head of the church's human rights office,
two days after his presentation of the final report of the Historical Memory Project (Recuperacion de la
Memoria Hist6rica-REHMI) on the conflict, was an important theme in the presentation of the Historical
Clarification Commission Report ten months later. That case continues to highlight the difficulty of
overcoming the intolerance, violence and impunity generated by the conflict. Witnesses, prosecutors and
judges have left Guatemala, often with the aid of the international community, because of death threats related
to their participation in helping carry that investigation and prosecution forward.
30. The recommendations are organized under the following categories: (1) measures for
remembering the victims; (2) reparations; (3) measures for promoting a culture of mutual respect and
observance of human rights; and (4) measures designed to strengthen the democratic process.
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Most of the human rights violations made known to the Commission
and which were perpetrated by State agents or allied para-military
groups came about with the knowledge, or by order of the highest
military authorities .... The results of our investigations demonstrate
that, in general, the excuse that mid-level commanders acted with a
wide margin of autonomy.., is unsubstantiated and totally lacking
any basis whatsoever. 3'
These findings, while attributing direct responsibility to the State for the
overwhelming majority of the violence, pointed out the specific role of the
executive, judicial,32 and legislative branches in committing human rights
violations and, ultimately, in fashioning the counter-insurgency State. The
Report also noted the active participation of various sectors of civil society,
including political parties, economically powerful groups, churches, members
of the university community, etc., in the counter-insurgency effort. On the basis
of an overall historical analysis, the Commission concluded that the conflict had
been more than a war between two armies, with the State on one side and the
guerrilla on the other. Rather, it represented the consequences of employing the
State machinery to carry out a policy of intolerance, exclusion, and racism.
The Oslo Accord, by authorizing the application of a broad human rights
legal framework, gave Guatemala the opportunity to reorder its priorities and
objectives and, in turn, create new expectations about the role of the State and
its institutions in society. This combined focus on institutional action and
historical context, was also the point of departure for the Commission's
exploration of whether genocide had been committed.
31. Speech by Christian Tomuschat upon the occasion of the presentation of Guatemala: Memory
of Silence, Feb. 25, 1998, on file with author. Author's translation. Tomuschat continued:
On the basis of having concluded that genocide was committed, the Commission also
concludes that, without prejudice to the fact that the participants in the crime include
both the material and intellectual authors of the acts of genocide committed in
Guatemala, State responsibility also exists. This responsibility arises from the fact that
the majority of these acts were the product of a policy pre-established by superior
order and communicated to the principal actors. The State also failed to comply with
its obligation to investigate and punish the acts of genocide committed within its
territory.
Id. See also Guatemala: Memory of Silence Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclu-
sions and Recommendations, English Version p. 38-41, or 105-126 (visited Feb. 18, 2000)
<http://www.hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/english/>.
32. The Report contains an entire section on the denial ofjustice, where it describes the complicity
in and direct perpetration of human rights violations by the judicial branch during the conflict. Guatemala:
Memory of Silence, Vol. I, Ch. II, Sec. XVI, Denial of Justice. Later on in Vol. IV on the consequences of
the conflict, there is a sub-heading discussing the phenomenon of impunity in Guatemala.
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III. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF GENOCIDE IN GUATEMALA
The Commission's final report containing its analysis, conclusions and
recommendations, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, was made public on
February 25, 1999. The Commissioners attributed the roots of the conflict to
the profound and historical divisions in Guatemalan society. Those divisions,
at the same time, ideological, social, economic and political fueled the early and
rapid formation of a counter-insurgency State under the auspices of a National
Security Doctrine whose stated priority was the defeat of the "internal enemy."
The Report, even while acknowledging that the United States played a role33 in
the initiation and development of the conflict through its hegemonic foreign
policy, interference in Guatemala's internal affairs and sometimes "direct...
support .. . [for] some of the State's illegal operations,"34 nevertheless
concluded that the diehard roots of the conflict were homegrown.35
One of the most deeply rooted divisions in Guatemalan society is
manifested in the extreme racism against the indigenous population, which
comprises a significant portion of the nation's citizenry.36 While that racism is
33. It has been suggested that a "truth commission" be formed to inquire into the United States role
in Guatemala leading up to and during the conflict in Guatemala. This moral inquiry could likewise take the
form of legal conclusions about the obligations of States in relation to the human rights of citizens of foreign
nations. Given the increasing sensitivity to international obligations to protect human rights and the
advancement of human rights law, such an inquiry would contribute a great deal to illustrating the way in
which countries might confirm their commitment to protect those rights. The excuse that the cold war
demanded drastic responses would put the United States on the same side of the debate as the Guatemalan
security forces responsible for the atrocities and who have voiced those same arguments.
34. Speech, Professor Tomuschat, on occasion of the presentation of Guatemala: Memory of
Silence, February 25, 1999, text on file with author. Author's translation.
35. The Oslo Accord mandated that the Commission consider both internal and external factors in
its clarification of the causes of the conflict. The Commission also alluded to the provision of military
training for the Guatemalan guerrilla by Cuba and noted that other than the United States declassified
documents, other countries, like Argentina and Nicaragua failed to respond with information requested by
the Commission. Israel responded that it had no information about official aid and that it could not control
the private activities of its citizens abroad. Guatemala:- Memory of Silence, Vol. 1, 129. There is literature
supporting allegations of direct training and involvement of intelligence specialists from Israel and Argentina
aiding the Guatemalan military, particularly in urban counter-insurgency operations and during the period
when the United States withdrew some of its military support in the late 70s. Clearly, however, the
overwhelming aid and support for the development of the counter-insurgency apparatus came from the United
States. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 1, Annex 7, a graph detailing the international context of
the conflict from 1962-96.
36. The data on the number of indigenous people in Guatemala is debated, as is the question of the
criteria for determining ethnic identity. The estimates range from forty to sixty percent of the population. The
present government has asserted that the indigenous population does not exceed forty perent while others
claim that this group comprises 60-80% of the population. This difference of opinion not only reflects the
unreliability of the censuses, but differing concepts of how to determine ethnic identity. The Commission
relied heavily on the victims' self-attribution of identity as well as on information contained in national
censuses. The national censuses relied on in the REPORT, contain data regarding numbers of Indigenous and
Ladino population in each of the municipalities.
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not often acknowledged publicly, there is a clear historic reality demonstrating
that the indigenous peoples have not been treated as full citizens. Whether your
measure is the level of investment of public monies in areas primarily populated
by Mayans, 31 the overwhelming poverty, low life expectancy, among other
measures of well-being, the absence of indigenous languages in the justice
system, public education or other services, or whether it is the not-so-distant
reality of compulsory forced labor for indigenous peasants, the message is clear.
The deep-seated racial hatred and mistrust represented by a long history of
repression and severe discrimination precipitated the grossly disproportionate
levels of violence directed by the State against the Mayan-indigenous peoples
within the overall context of this fratricidal conflict. The historic attribution of
particular characteristics to the "indigenous masses," an integral part of the
racist construct, determined the choice of military tactics against geographically
defined portions of this group when it was determined that 'they' constituted
a threat.
The ethnically Mayan-indigenous population suffered a full eighty-three
percent of all of the violations registered directly by the Commission.38
Without underestimating the brutality and intensity of the State-sponsored
violence against the Ladino39 or non-indigenous population,' the acts of
37. There are twenty-one separate ethnic identities that comprise the Mayan-indigenous population
of Guatemala. The remaining indigenous groups are the Xinca and Garffona. They have historically
inhabited primarily the Atlantic coast regions of the country.
38. "[The Mayan population has paid the highest cost for the irrational logic of the armed conflict,
particularly during the years of heaviest violence from 1978-83 when, in various regions of the country the
military identified groups of the Mayan peoples as natural allies of the guerrilla. This false conviction
increased the number and aggravated the nature of the human rights violations that were perpetrated against
the Mayans. This fact is evidenced by the aggressive, racist and extremely cruel nature of the violations that
resulted in the massive extermination of defenseless Mayan communities." Presentation Speech, Professor
Christian Tomuschat, Feb. 25, 1999, on file with author. Author's translation.
39. The "Ladino" population in Guatemala refers to the identity with group comprised by those
descended from the Spanish conquerors. The large mestizo, or mixed Mayan-Spanish population, comprises
the largest portion of the 'Ladino' group. This group identifies itself and is identified as separate from the
Mayan-indigenous ethnic group. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 1, Ch. I, Sec. II, Historical Causes,
250. See also generally, Vol. III, Ch. II, Sec. XVIII Violations of the Rights to Existence, Integrity and
Cultural Identity of the Indigenous Peoples.
40. There is no parallel among the documented abuses against the Ladino population. Members
associated with particular professions or types of organizations, such as unions, peasant leagues, opposition
political parties, law and humanities professors, schoolteachers, student organizations, the church and even
the judiciary were singled out for attack. Indeed, based on the Commission's information if genocide against
political groups was recognized, some of the political and union organizations would have had very credible
claims that genocide had been committed against them. But, in neither of these cases is there a wholesale
attack on entire towns, killing everyone and destroying homes and means of subsistence. Some may claim
this reflects the difference between urban and rural guerrilla warfare tactics. I am unconvinced. As I see it,
the ethnic identification among Ladinos meant that they could not entirely destroy the "other," because they
would be destroying a part of themselves. The divisions among Ladinos were based primarily on class,
although political association and other perceptions about "loyalty" also played a role.
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genocide, the report concludes, reflect a strategy and approach that maximized
the numbers of dead, tortured and disappeared, based on the ethnicity of the
victims."'There is a measure of justice in revealing the stark reality of a purpose
behind the deaths of tens of thousands and the suffering of hundreds of
thousands more human beings. In the end, the Commission's finding of State-
sponsored acts of genocide against groups of Mayan-indigenous peoples placed
squarely in the center of national debate one of the deepest fissures in
Guatemalan society, the struggle over the recognition of Guatemala's
multiethnic and multicultural national identity.' 2
IV. THE TRUTH ABOUT GENOCIDE
Truth has many attributes, including an individual and social
significance.43 While individual truth may vary according to perspective, social
truth demands the airing of multiple coexisting and often divergent, points of
view. The truth about genocide in Guatemala, while determined by a legal
definition, must take into account the experiences and perspectives of both the
aggressors and the victims.
The truth of genocidal intent centers around the process of the construction
of the "other," as the enemy. Statements by public officials, written references
contained in military documents and testimonies from members of the military'
indicated the choices of strategy and tactics at the command levels. Those
references betray the belief that the indigenous population possessed certain
inherent characteristics such as belligerency, unpredictability, gullibility, mis-
trust, and defiance of the State and its institutions. The group the Report refers
to as "Mayan-indigenous peoples," was identified in military documents as the
"indigenous highland peasants" or the "great masses of indigenous people."' 5
41. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I1, Ch. II, §. XXI, Genocide, 3584-91.
42. As part of the peace package, an Accord on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was
negotiated. All of the Accords can be found at the United Nations Verification Mission website, (visited Feb.
18, 2000) <http://www.minugua.guate.net>. The constitutional reforms which related to the implementation
of the Accords were defeated in a 1999 referendum.
43. The Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission [hereinafter TRC Report]
identified types of truth: factual or forensic truth, narrative or individual truth, social or restorative truth.
This last version of the truth, the TRC refers to as "the kind of truth that places facts and what they mean
within the context of human relationships - both amongst citizens and the State and its citizens." TRC
REPORT, Vol. I, Ch. 5 p. 113.
44. While secrecy was mandated around the identity of witnesses who spoke with the Commission,
the testimonies themselves are quoted throughout the text. Cites are to cases or key witnesses by number.
Occasionally, the cite refers to the quality of the witness, by referencing them as a former or actual member
of the armed forces and according to their rank, e.g., soldier, official or high-level official.
45. See the discussion of the State's general policy perspective in N 3226 to 3239, Guatemala:
Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II Sec. XXI, Genocide.
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The perceived propensity to sympathize with or to be part of the guerrilla,
based on monolithic preconceptions, is repeatedly affirmed by military
strategists. At the same time, references to the "great masses of indigenous
people" and their general situation of poverty and oppression serve to enhance
the stereotype of the Mayans' as natural enemies. Rather than deriving an
obligation to address the poverty or marginalization identified as the source of
disaffection, these elementsbecome yet anotherjustification for the perception
of the "other," as enemy. The conclusion of a military intelligence manual is
representative of this attitude when it asserts that, "[Tihe enemy has the same
sociological characteristics as the inhabitants of our highlands." '47 This clear
allusion to the Mayans, given that they constitute the overwhelming majority
of the inhabitants of the highland areas of Guatemala is characteristic of the
double-speak that attempts to rationalize and, at the same time, obscure an
entrenched sense of the "other."
The environment that permitted the creation of this construct is aptly
summed up by Guatemalan anthropologist, Marta Casaus Arzdi. Upon
completing an empirical study about attitudes towards race and class among
members of Guatemala's dominant classes, she reports that in addition to the
expressed preferences for miscegenation or continuing segregation as a means
of containing or resolving "the indigenous problem," some reported "preferring
ethnic cleansing.., between four and ten percent ... indicating their choice of
drastic and profoundly intolerant solutions for the indigenous population. This
sector expresses on various occasions being in favor of the extermination of the
indigenous population, of their disappearance both physically and culturally."48
Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the military tactic of destruction
was motivated by a fear that the support of this large community-based rural
population could result in a serious political and military challenge, including
the possibility of international recognition for the guerrilla forces were they
able to wrest control over a part of the national territory. In either event, the
Commission concluded that at the time and in the regions under consideration,
the enemy was conceived in ethnic terms, and that the violent acts constituting
genocide comprised, in turn, the implementation of the stated military objective
46. The Commission resolved the issue of identity by reference to subjective and objective
manifestations of this construct. The Constitutional recognition of the existence of Mayans, the allusions in
official documents reflecting perceptions of Mayans or indigenous as essentially a single group and the self-
identification of the Mayan-indigenous peoples based on a number of factors. (See Akayesu, shared language
and geography).
47. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 1HI Ch. XXI, Genocide, 3229.
48. Id. at Vol. HII Genocide, 3235, citing Guatemala: Lineaje y Racismo, Marta Casaus Arzi,
1995, p. 274. Author's translation.
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to destroy the guerilla and its parallel organizations. However, this time the
destructive intent was directed at a particular ethnic group.49
In the Commission's view, the motive for these genocidal acts (e.g., to win
the war) was distinguishable from the intent with which they were carried out.
Thus, it was concluded that in each of the four regions studied, the totality of
the killings, torture, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, the
destruction of entire villages and Mayan religious and cultural symbols,
community and religious leaders among other atrocities "perpetrated by State
agents or allied para-military groups with the knowledge, or by order of the
highest military authorities,"50 were all carried out with the intent to destroy a
substantial part" of the Mayan-indigenous peoples present in those areas of
operations at the time of the attacks.52
49. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. XXI, Genocide, 13256.
50. Speech of Professor Christian Tomuschat on occasion of the presentation of the Commission's
Report, 25 Feb. 1999.
On the basis of having concluded that genocide was committed, the Commission also
concludes that, without prejudice to the fact that the participants in the crime include
both the material and intellectual authors of the acts of genocide committed in
Guatemala, State responsibility also exists. This responsibility arises from the fact that
the majority of these acts were the product of a policy pre-established by a superior
command and communicated to the principal actors. The State also failed to comply
with its obligation to investigate and punish the acts of genocide committed within its
territory. Author's translation.
51. The author stated in Guatemala: Memory of Silence Vol. III, Ch. I, Sec. XXI, Genocide,
3225.
The destructive capacity of the aggressor is determined... by the physical scope of
his actions, that is, the portion of the population capable of suffering the attack given
the area within which the destructive acts occurred. So, for example, the genocidal
acts committed by a single military unit that operated in a particular region can only
be analyzed in relation to the overall population of a particular ethnic group inhabiting
that particular region. Consequently, in determining whether a substantial portion of
the group was affected, the analysis measured the destruction proportionally according
to the numbers of people belonging to the ethnic group that fell within the physical
scope of the operation.
Author's translation, original in Spanish follows.
La capacidad destructiva de la accitn del autor esti determinada, a su vez, por su ftea
de dominio que es la parte de la poblaci6n sobre la cual podrfa ejercer las acciones de
exterminio. Por ejemplo, las acciones de genocidio que cometi6 una unidad militar
que operaba en una determinada regitn, dinicamente se pueden analizar con relaci6n
a la poblaci6n de determinado grupo dtnico que se encontraba en esa regi6n. En
consecuencia, para determinar si se afect6 a una pare substancial del grupo, el andlisis
se realiz6 tomando en cuenta la proporci6n de poblaci6n del grupo dtnico que se
encontraba bajo el Area de dominio del autor."
52. The study analyzes the totality of acts and circumstances from 1980-83 in these regions, but
concludes that acts of genocide occurred there during 1981 and 82, the period representing the crescendo of
destructive violence. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. U, Sec. XXI Genocide, 3586 and 1
3601.
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V. THE LEGAL ANALYSIS
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
its Rule 61 Decision in the case against Karadzic and Mladic13 provided the
Commission with an important framework for the discussion of intent. That
decision validated the idea that genocidal acts could occur even where the
overall objective of the aggressor was not necessarily genocide. An ICTY Trial
Chamber laid out three categories of analysis for interpreting the specific intent
requirement for genocide:
1. the general political doctrine of the aggressor;
2. the repetition of discriminatory and destructive acts; and
3. the perpetration of acts which violate or are perceived by the
aggressor as violating the foundations of the group, whether or
not they constitute the enumerated acts prohibited in genocide
definition, and so long as they are part of the same pattern of
conduct.-
This third category -permitted the consideration of acts traditionally
qualified as representative of the concept of "cultural genocide," and histori-
cally excluded from the genocide definition, which is limited to the construct
of physical or mental" destruction. The Commission considered acts of
cultural destruction as signposts of the subjective intent of the attackers, when
they were committed together with the acts of physical destruction specifically
proscribed in the Genocide Convention. Thus, incidents of bombing of sacred
Mayan lands used for ritual worship or the deliberate burning of 'huipiles,'
traditional dress reflecting both the geographic origin and ethnicity of the
wearer, or the prohibition on ritual burial of the dead were indicative of an
intent to destroy the group, as such.
53. ICTY Case No. IT-95-5-R61 & No. rT-95-18-R61, Karadzic and Mladic, Decision of Trial
Chamber I, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, July 11, 1996.
54. ICTY Case No. IT-95-5-R61 & No. IT-95-18-R61, Karadzic and Mladic, Decision of Trial
Chamber I, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 11 July 1996, 94.
55. Art. il(b) of the Genocide Convention reflects this view when it prohibits acts "causing serious
physical or mental harm to members of the group" when they are committed with the intent to destroy the
group, in whole or in part, as such. See also Kelly Dawn Askin, WAR CkiMEsAGAiNST WOMEN (1997). "The
process of 'systematic human destruction is not only limited to physical extermination but also extends to
other forms of dehumanization.' Genocide can be demonstrated by an intent to destroy, wholly or partially,
physically or emotionally, an ethnic group." Id. at 338, (emphasis added), (citation omitted). See also Adrien
Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchn, Rape, Ethnicity and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black
America, 25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L REV. 1 (1993).
On the other hand, the religious and cultural significance that the Mayans
attribute to the cultivation of the land, and particularly of maize, also weighed
in on a second part of the analysis. The all-encompassing destruction
represented by the 'scorched earth' tactics left fleeing survivors, who lived
under marginal economic conditions in any event, with virtually no means of
subsistence, including no access to food, water, or shelter. These devastated
communities compelled to flee into unsettled mountain areas to seek refuge
from attack, were especially prone to disease in their weakened state. This led
to the conclusion that the destruction of homes and crops and entire villages
that formed part of the military attack, in addition to demonstrating a genocidal
intent, constituted the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to
bring about the partial physical destruction of the group.56
The overall approach to the issue began through the evaluation of
information contained in the database that registered the violations reported to
the Commission directly. Measured by numbers of deaths, the years from
1981-83 were identified as constituting the most violent period of the conflict.
An analysis of military strategies and patterns of violence leading up to and
following that period, including levels of guerrilla activity, revealed three stages
of military action that occurred in each of the four regions where acts of
genocide were documented.
The first stage, beginning prior to 1980, demonstrated a pattern of
selective repression57 characterized by the military targeting of the local
community, religious, and political leaders for death. These types of actions
increased in frequency over time and continued appearing in the second stage
as well. The second-stage violence reflected as its dominant mode, "indiscrim-
56. Art. Ill(c) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
57. This region is comprised by three municipalities in the northern portion of the Quich6 province,
Chajul, Cotzal and Nebaj. What follows is a description of the pattern of selective massacres in the Ixil
region. The security forces surrounded the community and gathered the people in the town square or
church... :
1) The women and children are separated from the men, (separation);
2) One hooded person identifies the guerrilla collaborators, this person generally
being from the same community, (selection);
3) Before the execution, biblical references are used, "Judgment day has come."
"We are going to divide those who are going to heaven from those who are
hellbound;"
4) The execution is carried out publicly, (killing).
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II, Ch. XXI, Genocide, 1 3284. Author's translation.
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inate massacres""8 and "scorched earth" tactics, where survivors were
compelled to either face starvation in the mountains or turn themselves in to
suffer death, torture or mistreatment. During the third stage, military efforts
reflect a focus on measures to consolidate the control gained through the
campaign of terror that resulted in the destruction and displacement of large
portions of the population. Offers of amnesty were made, based on the idea that
the fleeing population was somehow guilty of offenses. Effectively, the offer
of amnesty constituted an exchange of relative safety for signing a loyalty oath
and submitting to military control. The entrenchment of total military control
over the rural areas was achieved through the consolidation of the system of
military commissioners, 9 Civilian Defense Patrols and the organization of
model villages under the auspices of national and local "reconstruction"
committees. During this final period, rapes, killings, disappearances, and
torture continued on a diminished scale against this captive population.
The selective repression characteristic of the first stage debilitated the
communities' and left them without resources to organize their own defense.
During this stage, apart from spreading terror, the military gathered information
for intelligence assessments aimed at destroying the capability for local
communities to organize among themselves. The army often used its
intelligence capabilities, including masked informers, to forcibly recruit,
torture, or other wise single-out religious and political leaders, health workers,
and teachers, etc. Often members of these same communities were compelled
to participate in or witness the humiliation, torture, and death of respected
members of their own communities. The act of targeting leaders was
58. In my view the use of the word "indiscriminate" is somewhat misleading given the argument
that indigenous peoples were specifically being targeted. The idea being conveyed is that there was no effort
to separate out people as targets based on some objective criteria. Rather, the fact of ethnic affiliation was
sufficient to determine that they were a target, even if, as in the case of infants and young children, they could
not be said rationally to pose any possible military threat.
59. The numbers of military commissioners increased greatly in the 1960s. Previously, apart from
military recruitment, the commissioners were used as middlemen to enforce the system of compulsory
seasonal labor imposed on the indigenous peasants and at other times as the middlemen in the business of
supplying seasonal agricultural laborers to the large-scale plantations, found primarily in Guatemala's
southern coast. The REPORT talks about the role of military commissioners and civil defense patrollers in the
conflict and as part of the military strategy. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I, Ch. II, Sec. V and
VI, respectively.
60. Based on an interpretation of references contained in various Guatemalan Constitutions since
1945, the following is a definition of the designation "community:" "(a) the terms 'groups' or 'communities'
allude to entities that have a collective existence. It is not just a matter of individuals. It is the collectivity
that is the subject of rights and has the right to exist as such; (b) the concept of 'community' supposes the
existence of a collective identity and of an historical and socio-cultural identity that gives it cohesion. It does
not refer to a recently formed group. One is born and fives in the community." Guatemala: Memory of
Silence, Vol. II, Ch. lI, Section XVlI, Violations of the Rights to Existence, Integrity, and Cultural Identity
of the Indigenous Peoples, 1 2861.
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considered by the Commission to be directed at destroying the foundations of
the Mayan communities under attack. While the Commission refers to the
deliberate singling-out of leaders as an indication of intent to destroy the group,
it is the second-stage violence that exposes the determination to destroy the
group. During this stage the attacks became more generalized, targeting not
only leaders but also all members of the community, including men, women,
children, infants, and the elderly. As one declassified CIA document put it:
"The army's well-documented belief61 that the indigenous-Ixil population is
almost totally in favor of the EGP, has created a situation where you can expect
that the army will give no quarter to combatants and non-combatants alike. 62
Not only did the scope of the violence broaden, but also the mobilization
of forces reflected high-level coordination and planning in the attacks. For
example, the Ixil region and the northern strip of the Huehuetenango Depart-
ment (Maya-chuj and Maya-q'anjobal) where different military units were
mobilized even included the use of air support. In the municipality of Zacualpa,
Quich6 (Maya-k'ichd) the Commission identified a force of three platoons
aided by civil patrollers, with possible collaboration from a special military
strike force.63
In other regions where there was a less apparent showing of military
might, deliberate actions were taken to exploit local tensions between the
Ladino-controlled municipal township and the primarily indigenous villages,
over local resources. In the municipality of Rabinal (Maya-achi) in Alta
Verapaz, the Commission's information indicates the violence was primarily
perpetrated by a local military detachment together with Civil Defense Patrols. 6
61. The constituted violations that represent the predominant mode of destruction in the period
when genocide occurred were, by definition, attacks on defenseless civilian population. Defenseless is
defined by the Commission's Report as a situation of total or relative defenselessness, given that in some
communities they tried to defend themselves with machetes and stones against attacks by armed soldiers.
Thus, whether the Mayan-lxiles sympathized or not with the EGP faction of the guerrilla, is irrelevant for
determining whether the attacks were massacres. This is consistent with the perspective of human rights and
humanitarian law.
62. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. 11, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 3253, citing a partially
declassified CIA document released to the Commission by the United States Government.
63. The Gumarcaj Strike or Task Force took its name from the seat of the Quichd government
destroyed by the Spanish as part of its conquest of Guatemala. Gumarcaj is on the outskirts of the City of
Santa Cruz del Quichd and Mayan ritual ceremonies are still celebrated there.
64. The Civilian Self-Defense Patrols were formed as part of the military strategy to control the
local population and prevent the entrenchment of the guerrilla in the countryside. The patrollers were
obligated to patrol regularly and report their observations to the military commissioner or local military
commander. Often the patrols resulted in the capture of a person or persons to be handed over to the military
or other authorities or they were attacked directly by the patrollers for suspected guerrilla activity. The
patrollers were also victims of the violence when they were obliged to commit acts of violence against others,
or when they were themselves attacked or killed by the military. Patrolling was one form of demonstrating
fealty but accusations also made patrollers themselves targets. They were considered by the Commission as
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This modality was also used in areas where larger numbers of troops were
deployed. For example, the Ixil region and the northern strip of Huehuetenango
Department (Maya-chu and Maya-g'anjobal) different military units were
mobilized and included the use of air support. The methods used to promote
attacks by members of the Mayan-indigenous ethnic group against members of
their own ethnic group, were interpreted as a deliberate strategy directed at
destroying the group's very foundations.
In each of the four regions, the report explores the strategic location as a
transport corridor for the guerilla and an area where the guerilla had the
political sympathy of members of the local population because of organizing
work with peasant leagues that had been formed under the Arbenz Government
in the 1950s, in conjunction with land reform efforts. In Rabinal, it is not
unlikely, according to the Commission's account, that one of the factors that
determined the target group was the Achi communities' reluctance to give up
communal lands to a large dam project which was considered beneficial to
other local interests. On the other hand, Rabinal also represented a
geographically-strategic location as a transport corridor for the guerrilla and an
area where the guerrilla had the political sympathy of members of the local
population because of organizing work with peasant leagues formed under the
Arbenz Government in conjunction with land reform efforts under that
government. These additional layers of motive, all of which were related to the
conflict and its underlying causes, did nothing to dissipate the Commission's
conviction that the acts under consideration in each of the four regions during
the 1981-83 period, demonstrated the same pattern of genocidal intent and
action. The determination to enter the second stage of the violence was a
deliberate military decision in the Commission's view.
At the same time that the attacking group's general political doctrine
identified members of the group, "Mayan-indigenous peoples" as the target, the
similarities in the patterns of violence within and among the four regions and
the disparate impact of the violence on the Mayans as opposed to the Ladino
population inhabiting the same geographic areas, reflected a pattern of
repetitive and discriminatory65 acts of violence.
agents of the State responsible for acts of violence, however, the obligatory nature of the patrols also
constituted a violation of the patrollers' right to freely exercise their rights of association, as well as an illegal
delegation of State police powers. The specific section of the PACs, explores the operation of the patrols,
their formation, training, structure, functions, and their role in the overall counter-insurgency strategy.
65. The conclusion that the acts were discriminatory is supported in two ways. One, the statistical
conclusion showing a disparate proportional impact between numbers of Indigenous and Ladino victims from
among the population in each of the areas studied. Second, the narrative portion relates instances where the
Ladino population was specifically excluded from attack or warned to leave the area in advance of the attack.
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The patterns in the way the massacres" were conducted reflected planning
on the one hand and measures designed to maximize the number of victims, on
the other. They were carried out on market days when people from outlying
areas would gather in the towns, or the community would be called to gather in
the town center, only to be surrounded and attacked. Women and children were
often separated from the men in order to begin the macabre ritual of torture,
killing, and destruction. Sixty-four percent of the massacres occurring during
the thirty-four year conflict took place between June 1981 and December 1982.
Of particular relevance to the Commission was the observation that:
When faced with all the available alternatives to combat the insur-
gency, the State opted for the one that was most costly in human lives
from among the civilian non-combatant population. Ruling out other
options, such as political struggle to arrive at agreements with the
non-combatant civilian population it considered disaffected, their
relocation to areas outside the conflictive zones, or the arrest of
insurgents, the State opted for the annihilation of those it considered
to be its enemies. The State made this determination despite the fact
that it had access to the sources of information necessary to identify
the insurgent combatants, assess their military capacity, and enable
them to distinguish the insurgents from civilian non-combatants.67
66. The Commission defined massacre as an attack on the defenseless. In the cases where there was
resistance, if it was so disproportional to the attack that the resistance was futile, the incident was still
qualified as a massacre.
".... What characterizes the majority of the massacres, apart from the executions, is
an accumulation of grave violations of human rights, such as torture, cruel and
inhuman treatment, forced disappearances and rape, and also aberrant acts such as the
mutilation of cadavers, and the destruction of personal, communal, and religious
property.
The CEH [Historical Clarification Commission] has defined a massacre as the
arbitrary execution of more than five people, committed in a single place and as part
of a single operation, when the victims are in a state of absolute or relative.
defenselessness."
"... Lo que caracteriza a la mayorfa de las masacres, ademis de las ejecuciones, es
una acumulaci6n de graves violaciones de derechos humanos, como torturas, tratos
crueles, desapariciones forzadas y violaciones sexuales, y tambiin hechos aberrantes,
tales como la mutilaci6n de cadAveres, y la destrucci6n de bienes de personas,
comunitarios y destinados al culto.
"La CEH ha definido una masacre como la ejecuci6n arbitraria de mis de cinco
personas, realizada en un mismo lugar y como parte de un mismo operativo, cuando
las vfctimas se encontraban en un estado de indefensi6n absoluta o relativa."
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II, Sec. XX, Collective Violence against
the Collective Population, 1 3058-59.
67. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. Ill, Ch. U, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 1 3600.
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The means of the violence, its extreme barbarity and deliberately public
nature, were other indicators of the intent to destroy the group by causing
serious physical or mental harm to members of the group. These extremes,
representing the nuance captured by the third category of acts, designed to
attack the very foundations of the group, included: the display of mutilated,
tortured, and sexually violated victims; obligating members of the group to
commit acts of violence against one another and in full view of the entire
community; the killing of girl-children, infants, women, and the elderly;
systematic, public and gang rapes of women; including girls and pregnant
women; and the gouging of fetuses from women's bodies. The sexual
mutilation and display of cadavers and similarly horrific acts were the kinds of
brutality that the Commission opined was designed to not only physically
destroy members of the group, but to destroy any basis for social cohesion
within the group. The dehumanization of the victims by their aggressors was
both another layer in the construction of the enemy "other," and a means of
attacking the group's very foundations.
The tactic of turning members of the group against one another was also
a way of inflicting serious mental harm on members of the group.6" It varied in
its modality. Different shades of "obligation" were represented, from direct
threats on life to inciting mistrust among neighbors or neighboring communi-
ties. In both cases the Commission determined they were borne of a conscious
decision to compromise the loyalties of the members of the group as one avenue
of its destruction. Those people who were obligated, upon threat of death or
serious physical harm to themselves or others, to either perpetrate atrocities
against members of their own communities or to witness them, had been caused
"serious mental harm" as proscribed under the Genocide Convention. They
were included, if not statistically, then in principle, as among the victims of the
genocidal attacks. 9
Similarly, the accounts of sexual violence took on particular importance
for the Commission beyond constituting a cause of death or serious physical
and mental harm. Eighty-nine percent of the rape victims registered by the
Commission were indigenous women and girl-children, the latter constituting
thirty-five percent of the victims. The sexual violence against women during
the height of the violence was most often a prelude to their murder. The rapes
were inflicted in a way that the entire community would share the shame and
terror. Like the obligation to participate in the torture and murder of neighbors
or community leaders, these occurrences, in addition to damaging the women
68. Art. 1ll(b) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
69. The effect of destroying the social cohesion of the group characteristic of these acts [causing
physical and mental harm to members of the group] corresponds to an intent to annihilate the group
physically and spiritually. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 1 3592.
themselves altered the relationship between them and other members of their
communities. This form of violence, almost exclusively directed against
women and girl-children, was an act of violence not only against individual
women as women or girl-children as girl-children, but also an attack against
their ethnic group as a whole. In Mayan society, as in many others, women play
roles of significance both to the biological reproduction and social continuity
of the group. For the commission, the systematic, public, massive and graphic
perpetration of sexual violence against Mayan-indigenous women and girl-
children betrayed an intent to destroy both individual members of the group and
the social ties that bound it together.
While the Commission does not reach the explicit conclusion that these
practices constituted the "imposition of measures intended to prevent births
within the group," as prohibited by Art. 11(d) of the Genocide Convention, the
section on sexual violence against women does contain testimonies attesting to
the effects of these types of violence on the physical and psycho-social ability
of the women affected to form intimate relationships or exercise their
reproductive prerogative in the context of their communities. The only explicit
references to "measures that impeded births within the group" allude to the
reported cases where fetuses were ripped from their mother's wombs or of
sexual mutilation.70
The special section on Sexual Violence against Women 7 reveals much
about the effects of the violence on the indigenous communities as a whole.
The vast majority of testimonies about the rapes came from persons other than
the direct victims of these acts, demonstrating a reluctance of the surviving
victims to speak about how they were attacked.
In most cases the suffering of women rape victims is unknown by even
their closest family members, children, husband, or parents, and in the cases
where the whole community knows, it is silenced or denied, a fact which
demonstrates the extreme shame that rape survivors and their communities
feel. 72 This fact also demonstrates the extent to which the victimized women
are compelled to suffer from the effects of rape alone and in silence.
While it is recognized that rape was used on a massive and systematic
scale as part of the overall insurgency attack and despite the Commission's
acknowledgment that rape can constitute a crime against humanity under
international criminal law, it does not state a general determination with regard
to rape in the Guatemalan conflict. Instead, the findings on genocide assert that
the sexual violence causing serious physical or mental harm to members of the
70. There are accounts of rape and other forms of sexual violence against men, but they constituted
less than one percent of the sexual violence reported.
71. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II1, Ch. II, Sec. XIII.
72. Id. 1 2382.
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group and committed in the context of the violence in the four regions studied,
were constituent acts of genocide and, at the same time, indicia of the intent to
destroy the group. The Commission clearly relies on the record of the
systematic use of brutal and often public sexual attacks against women and girl-
children as evidence of the intent to destroy the group, as such.73
The conclusion that genocidal acts had been committed in all four regions
was reached on the basis of the analysis I have just described. There are
additional facts and circumstances not specifically mentioned which are similar
to some of the ones discussed here. There are also attendant circumstances
which were not. specifically factored into the analysis. For instance, the
massive and forced military recruitment of indigenous youths. These troops,
wrested from the heart of their communities, may have participated in brutal
attacks against their own or other indigenous communities.
Nevertheless, the effects of violence are amply explored in both the section
on Violations of the Rights to Existence, Integrity, and Cultural Identity of the
Indigenous Peoples74 and in the fourth volume of the Report that documents the
consequences of violence for indigenous communities." Reference is made to
the consequences of the violence for traditional Mayan forms of authority and
organization, including religion, community values, and other expressions of
cultural identity. Implicitly, these consequences were foreseeable and go far
towards explaining what we mean when we say that there is an intent to destroy
an ethnic group. However, they do not form part of the specific genocide
analysis that concludes that the military, as an agent of the State, was directly
responsible for acts of genocide and that the State was also responsible for
genocidal acts in failing to investigate and punish those crimes under
international and Guatemalan law.
Additionally, a statistical study was performed to determine the percentage
of the indigenous population killed in each region. The results indicated that
sixteen percent of the Maya-Achi indigenous group in the Rabinal Municipality
73. This conclusion is not novel. In July 1996, a trial chamber in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia gave ample support for this view in its affirmation of the indictments
against Karadzic and Mladic for genocide, supra note 50. Scholars have echoed this view as well: When all
surrounding circumstances point to the conclusion that women (or men) were sexually assaulted with an
intent to destroy their particular protected group by physical destruction or mental anguish, a charge of
genocidal rape should be sustained. Kelly Dawn Askin, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN PROSECU TON IN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 276 (1997). See also Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-
Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 243 (1994). Ukewise,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found defendant Akayesu guilty of genocide based on acts
of sexual violence. See Akayesu Judgment, September 2, 1998 at <http'//www.ictr.org> (visited Feb. 18,
2000.)
74. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II1, Ch. 11, Sec. XVIII, 2889-2903.
75. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. IV, Ch. ll Sec. IV, Rupture of the Social Fabric, N
4325-4413.
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were killed. In Zacualpa, 8.6% of Maya-K'ichds were killed and in the Ixil
region, 14.5% of the Mayan-Ixiles, while in the northern strip of
Huehuetenango, 3.6% of the Maya-Chuj and Maya-Q'anjobal peoples residing
in that area were assassinated.76 These statistics do not take into account the
members of the group who survived, having suffered from serious physical or
mental harm as a result of the violence or who were compelled to live under
conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction.
While the statistics confirm high numbers of deaths, they do not resolve
issues that may arise around the definition of the targeted ethnic group. Nor do
they clarify what we mean when we refer to "the foundations of the group," that
is, the essential values underlying the concept of a human group that is
protected by the Genocide Convention. Nor do they rule out the logical defense
to these findings, that the acts were committed with the intent to subjugate and
control, but not to destroy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission's conclusion that the Guatemalan State, through the
direct acts of its military and para-military forces committed acts of genocide
against the Mayan-indigenous peoples, and that the State was also responsible
for those acts by virtue of its failure to investigate and punish them as required
under Articles IV" and VP8 of the Genocide Convention, has generated its own
polemic. On the date of the celebration of Army Day, June 30th, 1999,
President Arzti was reported in the Guatemalan press as making the following
statements:
The President denied that there was genocide during the armed
conflict, disagreeing for the first time with the Historical Clarification
Commission Report that affirms the opposite position. 'Genocide
represents the extermination of an ethnicity and that didn't happen in
Guatemala,' he said ... Arzti, gave his personal opinion that he,
'doesn't believe that there was genocide because that was not the
motive for the brutal conflict that we lived through and that tore apart
76. See respective conclusions for each region in Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II,
Sec. XXI Genocide, and Vol. XII, Annex III, Methodology Document Elaborated by The American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Graphs 3 and 4.
77. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 111 shall be punished
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals. Art. IV, Genocide
Convention.
78. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction. Art. VI, Genocide Convention.
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the social fabric of the country."79
In its recommendations, the Clarification Commission had called on the
State to vigorously apply the National Reconciliation Law by criminally
prosecuting and convicting the perpetrators of genocide, torture, and forced
disappearances."0 The Presidential denial, albeit a "personal" opinion, fails to
address the obvious alternative. Whether or not those acts documented by the
Commission constitute genocide or not, they are certainly war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Once that is conceded, it becomes important to ask
the question of whether the extreme barbarity of those acts and their scope
preclude any rational interpretation of these coordinated attacks as a means of
achieving control.
The inquiry into the subjective intent of the perpetrators must necessarily
rely on all the manifestations of intent, whether they are found in the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the acts themselves, statements that reveal the
intent with which they were committed, or the overall context in which they
occurred. It would be artificial to eliminate from the radar of genocide-
prevention those cases where more subtle forms of discrimination translate into
acts intended to destroy one of the protected groups, under the pretext of a cold
war, civil war, or any other pretense. The classic examples of genocide,
represented by the Holocaust and the killings in Rwanda in 1994, do not make
less apparent efforts to destroy a social, racial, ethnic, or national group in
whole or in part, any less pernicious.
The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission's conclusions are
instructive in this regard. In the analytical summary referring to the Ixil region,
the Commission stresses that the intent to partially destroy the Maya-Ixil ethnic
group emanates from a tactical military decision that was reached, based on
particular pre-conceptions:
In the Commission's judgment, the totality of violent acts perpetrated
by the State against the Maya-Ixil population from 1980-1983,"'
79. "... el presidente neg6 que haya habido genocidio durante el conflicto armado, discrepando
por primera vez con el informe de la Comisi6n para el Esclarecimiento Hist6rico... que afirma lo contrario.
'El genocidio representa el exterminio de una etnia y eso no se dio en Guatemala', dijo. Arzd opin6 ayer, a
titdlo personal, que 'no creo' que haya habido genocidio porque 'ese no fue el motivo del brutal conflicto que
nos toc6 vivir y que desgarr6 el tejido social del pats,"' in Arzfi Aboga por Espinoza, Prensa Ubre,
Wednesday June 30, 1999. Author's translation.
80. The 1996 NATIONAL RECONCILIATION LAW, Decree 145-96, also makes reference to the
possibility of prosecuting crimes that are not capable of being prescribed according to domestic law or
international treaties ratified by Guatemala. Genocide is, in any event, a criminal offense under Guatemalan
law. See GUATEMALA'S CRIMINAL CODE DECREE 17-73 as reformed (1997) Art. 376.
81. The use of the 1980-83 time period refers to the totality of circumstances that led to the
conclusion that acts of genocide have been committed. However, the overall conclusion in this section refers
permits the conclusion that acts of genocide were committed. These
acts were inspired by a strategic determination of a genocidal
character. The objective of the counter-insurgency military campaign
was the partial destruction of the victim group, based on the
consideration that this would ensure the enemy's defeat.82
In the discussion about the definition of the crime of genocide, what
continues to be lacking is a dialogue about the characteristics of a human group
that give definition to its existence. In the case of Guatemala, there is no doubt
that the Mayan-indigenous peoples experienced the attacks against them as an
attempt to destroy them and their way of life. This sentiment is repeatedly
expressed in the testimonies gathered by the Commission and reproduced in the
text of the report. It is equally clear that criminal law focuses on the
aggressor's intent in carrying out these atrocities, especially when culpability
for a specific intent crime such as genocide is at issue. As questions begin to
be addressed, the overall query that remains is how the collective Guatemalan
community, Indigenous and Ladino together, will meet the challenge of forging
a peace based on mutual respect and the adherence to fundamental principles
of human rights.
Will a Commission be sensitive to the word "truth"? If its interest is
linked only to amnesty and compensation, then it will have chosen not
truth, but justice. If it sees truth as the widest possible compilation of
people's perceptions, stories, myths and experiences, it will have
chosen to restore memory and foster a new humanity, and perhaps
that is justice in its deepest sense.83
to acts of genocide having occurred between 1981 and 1982, in consideration of this period as representative
of the all-encompassing indiscriminate violence. The discussion of each region refers more specifically to
the massacres and surrounding acts it considers genocidal.
82. Guatemala: Memory of Silence Vol. I1, Ch. 11, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 13357.
83. Antjie Krog, COUNTRY OP MY SKULL 16 (1998), referring to the process of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.
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